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RECENT CASES
EVIDENCE: RIGH{T TO COUNSEL--Justice White
in his dissenting opinion in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S.
478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964), said that this
decision appears to be another major step in the direction of the goal which the Court seemingly has in
mind-to bar from evidence all admissions obtained
from individuals suspected of crime, whether involuntarily made or not. Are Justice White's fears justified or
will the Supreme Court limit the rule set out in the
Escobedo case to the facts of the case?
As a suspect in the shooting of his brother-in-law,
Danny Escobedo was arrested but released on a writ
of habeas corpus. Later in the month, he was arrested
again. The petitioner requested to see his attorney at this
time and continued requesting to see his attorney
throughout the subsequent interrogation by the police.
Escobedo's attorney was present at the police station
but was refused permission to see the petitioner. Durinz
the interro"ation, the petitioner made statements which
implicated him with the murder. At the trial, a motion
was made to supress the incriminating statements, and
this motion was denied.
The standard which the United States Supreme Court
applied in determining the admissibility of the incriminating statements was:
...[W]here, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect
has been taken into police custody, the police carry
out a process of interrogations that lends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has
requested and been denied an opportunity to consult
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-with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively
warned him of his absolute constitutional right to
remain silent, the accused has been denied 'the assistance of counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as 'made obligatory to the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment,' (citation
omitted) and no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a
criminal trial. (12 L. Ed. 2d at 986)
The Escobedo case is the third case since 1963 which
has extended the right of the accused to counsel under
the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution. Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 ]U. S. 335, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 83 S. Ct.
792 (1963), held that every person accused of a crime,
whether state or federal, is entitled to a lawyer at his
trial. The case of Massiah,v. United States, 377 U. S.
201, 12 L. Ed. 246, 84 S. Ct. 1199 (1964), extended the
right to counsel even further by holding that the accused
has a right to counsel from and after the finding of the
indictment.
June 22, 1964, was the date that the Escobedo case
was decided. There have already been at least 59 state
supreme court decisions which have discussed the application of this new standard established by the Escobedo case. The cases are split as to how far the right to
counsel has been extended.
In People v. Dorado, 40 Cal. Rptr. 264, 394 P. 2d 952
(1964), the California Supreme Court said:
We hold, in the light of recent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, that, once the investigation focused on defendant, any incriminating
statements given by defendant during interrogation
by the investigating officers becomes inadmissible in
absence of counsel and by the failure of officers to
advise defendant of his riiht to an attorney and his
right to remain silent. (394 P. 2d at 953)
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The court felt that the Escobedo case was not limited to
its facts. It said that the accused does not have to actually request to be allowed to speak to his attorney. The
effect of this standard, as the California court interprets the Escobedo case, is that the constitutional right
to counsel precludes the use of any incriminating evidence unless this right is intelligently waived, and no
waiver can be presumed if the investigating officer does
not inform the suspect of his right to counsel or his right
to remain silent. This writer believes that this is the
most liberal interpretation to date.
The more conservative application is expressed by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Coyle,
415 Pa. 379, 203 A. 2d 782 (1964), wherein it said:
* . * [WIe do not interpret Escobedo to mean that,
counsel must immediately be afforded one taken into
custody, under all circumstances, particularly
where none was requested. The mere fact that appellant was unrepresented by counsel during the
questioning does not invalidate admissions made
against interest. (203 A. 2d at 794)
The Pennsylvania court seems to limit the application of
the rule set out in the Escobedo case to where the suspect requests counsel and such request is denied. The
exclusionary rule, by this interpretation, will not apply
if the accused does not request the right to see his attorney, even if he is ignorant of his right to do so.
Many state supreme courts distinguish their case from
Escobedo on the facts. For example, the Maryland Supreme Court in Mefford v. State, 235 Md. 497, 201 A.
2d 824 (1964), said that an essential element in the
Escobedo case was missing. In the Mefford case, the
police advised the defendant of his right to remain silent.
The court felt that this was all a lawyer would advise the
defendant; so, there was no violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights.
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This writer believes that there is little merit in this
position. It would be unrealistic to assume that the Supreme Court believed that Escobedo's lawyer did not advise him of his right to remain silent sometime before the
statements, which the court excluded, were made.
Virginia, before the Escobedo case, did not consider
the absence of counsel to be of great importance when
incriminating statements were elicited. In James v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 713, 66 S. E. 2d 513 (1951), the defendant was charged with receiving stolen goods. The
defendant objected to the introduction of testimony by
the sheriff and his deputy as to statements made by a
person who was under arrest and not advised as to his
legal rights when the statements were made. The court
said that there was no merit to either contention and
that the confession was admissible in absence of any inducement, threat, or promise of reward or hope thereof
held out by person in authority, even if made while under
arrest. The court did not feel any necessity of discussing
the failure to advise the person of his legal rights.
In Ward v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 564, 138 S. E. 2d
293 (1964), the accused was tried for murder. Before
any statements were elicited from the accused, the officers advised him that anything he said would be used
against him and that he had a right to consult an attorney. The defendant thereafter voluntarily made a confession. The court said that there was no rule of law
which requires an arresting officer to close his ears to
statements voluntarily made by a person in his presence.
In distinguishing this .case from Escobedo the court said:
In that case defendant was refused the right to
talk with counsel after counsel arrived at the place
where defendant was being detained, and at no time
was Escobedo advised of his constitutional rights.
Such are not the facts in the case at bar. Even under
the strict rules laid down by the Supreme Court the
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statements in this instance would, in our opinion, be
admissible. (205 Va. at 572, 138 S.E. 2d at 299)
Any theory at this time as to how far the Supreme
Court will follow its policy of excluding statements made
by the accused would be pure conjecture. However, no
matter how far the Supreme Court goes in construing
the right to counsel, the police will be severely limited
as to what they can do in interrogating suspects. As
Justice White said, "The right to counsel now not only
entitles the accused to counsel's advice and aid in preparing for trial but stands as an impenetrable barrier to
any interrogation once the accused has become a suspect."
FiAxx E. LiwcH

TORTS: COVENANTS NOT TO SUE--There is no
doubt that in Virginia a "release" of one joint tortfeasor, by a person having an action against them, releases all of the joint tort-feasors. This is true even
where there is an explicit reservation of rights evidenced in the agreement as regards the remaining joint
tort-feasors. This statement has been reiterated many
times in Virginia cases and is apparently adhered to
today. Ruble v. Turner, 2 Hen. & M. (12 Va.) 38 (1808);
Bland v. Warwickshire Corp., 160 Va. 131, 168 S. E. 443
(1933); Shortt v. Hudson Supply a.nd Equipment Company, etc., 191 Va. 306, 60 S. E. 2d. 900 (1950).
However, it is the sole object of this note to examine
the covenant not to sue, relate it to these and more recent cases, and attempt to determine its standing in
Virginia.
In the case of Ruble v. Turner, supra, the court reiterated the common law rule that a "release" of one
joint tort-feasor released all. The court refers to both
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the "release" and the "accord and satisfaction," saying finally that the instrument in itself indicates a satisfaction with the tort-feasor. So even though the court
frequently refers to the instrument as a release, the
opinion leaves very little doubt that the case was decided on the basis that the plaintiff had an accord and
satisfaction with the joint tort-feasor.
In the case of Bland v. Warwickshire, supra, the sole
question was whether an absolute release, not under seal,
of one joint tort-feasor, which contains a reservation of
the rights against the other tort-feasors, operates as a
release of all of the tort-feasors. The court stated in a
brief opinion that "after a careful review of the question the Court is of the opinion that the doctrine laid
down in Ruble v. Turner, supra, should be adhered to."
In the more recent case of Shortt v. Hudson Supply and
Equipment Company, supra, the plaintiff had given, for
a substantial consideration, an instrument which said in
part, "It is expressly understood that this is a covenant
not to sue and not a release." The court stated the
general rule of law that a covenant not to sue, as distinguished from a release, does not operate to discharge the
covenantee's claim against the other tort-feasors. Then
the court cited Ruble, supra, and stated that the plaintiff in that case "having effected an accord and satisfaction with one tort-feasor, his claim against the others
responsible for his injuries was discharged" and indicated that this case came directly within the holding of
the Ruble case, supra. (Emphasis supplied.) The court
went on to say that it was the satisfaction of the claim
by one of the tort-feasors and not the form of the instrument that extinguished the claim of the plaintiff.
The court in Shortt, supra, indicated that even though
the instrument signed by the plaintiff did not indicate
that the consideration was accepted as full satisfaction
of the claim against the tort-feasor, that under the circumstances it was plain that the sum was paid and ac-
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cepted with this in mind. It appears that the court felt
that there had been an accord and satisfaction which
would operate to extinguish the claims against the tortfeasors, regardless of the instrument involved.
In the most recent case on this subject, Lackey v.
Brooks, 204 Va. 428, 132 S. E. 2d 461 (1963), a lessor of
tractor-trailer trucks covenanted not to sue the lessee
for damage to the leased vehicles. As a result of a collision, one of the vehicles was damaged and the estate of
the lessee's employee, who was alleged to have negligently operated the vehicle, was sued by the lessor.
The lower court stated in regard to the agreement that
"this is in the nature of a covenant not to sue," then
cited Shortt, supra, and said that the release of one joint
tort-feasor released all the joint tort-feasors, including
the employee. However, the Supreme Court of Appeals
reversed and said that " '[by the great weight of authority, a covenant not to sue one joint tort-feasor, as
distinguished from a release, does not operate to discharge the covenator's claim against other joint tortfeasors,' " and that upon the same principle, ". . . a
bare covenant not to sue the master for the tortious act
of the servant is not a bar to an action against the
servant for the latter's tortious conduct."
The questions facing the court were whether the instrument was a covenant not to sue and, if so, to whom
the covenant ran. The court seemed to have little trouble
finding that the instrument was a covenant not to sue,
and stated that the latter question was the critical one,
holding that the covenant did not run to the employee.
For the purpose of this note the ruling of the court that
the instrument was a covenant not to sue is accepted, and
the question now is, if it can be established that an instrument is in fact a covenant nol to sue, what is its
effect?
The court in Lackey, supra, regarded it as settled, on
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the authority of Shortt, supra, that the covenant not to
sue would not release the claims of the covenantee
against other tort-feasors. Therefore, from a consideration of this case, and the others mentioned, it appears
that the covenant not to sue has, as a practical matter, a
new status in Virginia law. From my observations it appears that a covenant not to sue will be held to be a valid
instrument in the law of Virginia, if, upon consideration
of the instrument and the amount paid, the court finds
that the circumstances do not indicate that there was
an accord and satisfaction as regards the amount paid
by the covenantee, or a release. This holding would place
Virginia in the majority because there are only a few
jurisdictions today in which it is impossible to settle with
one tort-feasor without releasing another; Prosser,
LAW OF TORTS, §46, (3rd ed. 1964).
These cases say that a release, even though it contains a reservation of the rights of the injured party,
will operate to release all joint tort-feasors, and they
also say that an accord and satisfaction with one will release the others. In addition, in the light of Lackeyi v.
Brooks, supra, the cases now indicate that a covenant
not to sue, without an accord and satisfaction, will allow
the injured party to continue to prosecute his action
against the remaining joint tort-feasors. Note that this
statement of the law deals with a very limited situation
and does not touch the problem of whether or not there
has been an accord and satisfaction, nor does it deal with
the problem of whether the court will construe an instrument as a covenant not to sue or a release. These
problems must still be overcome before the rule of law

will apply.
Tao1As N. NANiE
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS:
JURISDICTION
TO
AWARD CUSTODY OF CHILDREN-F and M and
their four children lived in Jasper, Indiana. F deserted
M and children on July 25, 1959, and moved to Mississippi where he cohabited with N, an unmarried female, who in time gave birth to F's illegitimate son. In
1960, F and N and their son established residency in
Nansemond County, Virginia, where they were residing
when M, on February 8, 1962, filed suit in the Nansemond
County Circuit Court against F praying for an a vinculo
divorce on the ground of desertion. The circuit court
gTanted M an absolute divorce and the custody of the
four children, together with support money for the children, alimony, and counsel fees for herself. At no time
was M or any of the four children a resident of or domiciled in the state of Virginia and not one of the children
was physically present within Virginia so as to afford
a jurisdictional basis for determining custody. On the
evening preceding the trial and the morning of the trial,
three of the children were in Suffolk, Virginia, but thereafter they immediately returned to their home in Indiana.
In Gramelspacherv. Gramelspacher, 204 Va. 839, 134
S. E. 2d 285 (1964), the Supreme Court of Virginia, in a
unanimous decision, affirmed the circuit court, holding
that with reference to custody of children the proceeding
was in personam so that personal jurisdiction over both
parents was all that was required to give the court jurisdiction to award custody. This decision is one of first
impression in Virginia.
There is a considerable conflict of authority as to what
is required for jurisdiction to award custody of children.
Some courts hold that a child must be domiciled within
the state before that state has jurisdiction to award
custody. See Annot., 9 A. L. R. 2d 434 (1950). Other
courts use as a sole test, or add as an alternative basis
for custody jurisdiction, the physical presence of the
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child within the state. Some of these cases deem it necessary that such physical presence constitute actual
residence. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N. Y. 429, 148 N. E. 624
(1925). A third view followed by Gramelspacher,supra,
which states this view to be the weight of authority today, establishes custody jurisdiction upon the personal
jurisdiction of both parents. See Annot., 4 A. L. R. 2d 7
(1949).
Essentially there are two theories upon which to base
the prerequisites for custody jurisdiction. The first is
that the court acts for the state as an interested party,
or parens patriae, to provide for the welfare and interests of the child. The second is that the court acts as
a disinterested person and determines the in personam
rights of the parents. Payton v. Payton, 29 N. At. 618,
225 Pac. 576 (1924). The first of these two theories supports the domicile test and the actual physical presence
or residence test of custody jurisdiction, while the second supports the personal jurisdiction of both parents
test.
Underlying the domicile test is the idea that a custody
award affects the domestic status of the child, jurisdiction over whom rests only with the state of the child's
domicile.
Since custody of a child by one parent carries
with it domicil and a domestic status, jurisdiction
to give the child to one parent or the other depends
in principle on the domicil of the child ... and a
decree for custody rendered in a state where the
child is not domiciled is void for lack of jurisdiction.
(2 BEAL, CONFLICT OF LAws §144.3 (1935) )
As the state of a child's domicile is especially interested
in the child's welfare, it would seem that the courts of
that state should have power to determine the child's
custody, but this is not necessarily a sound reason for
holding that the state of domicile alone has jurisdiction.
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If a child resides in one state and has his domicile in
another state, the court at his actual residence may be
much more competent to designate the person entitled to
his custody than the court at his legal domicile. It is for
this reason that some courts require physical presence or
residence as a prerequisite for custody jurisdiction. As
Justice Cardozo said in Finay,supra:
The jurisdiction of a state to regulate the custody
of infants found within its territory . . . has its
origin in the protection that is due to the incompetent or helpless. (Citations omitted) For this, the
residence of the child suffices though the domicile be
elsewhere. (148 N. E. at 625)
The distinction between mere physical presence and
residency is primarily a matter of intention. Therefore,
the distinction is often difficult to make, especially in the
case of an infant. Often a court, in passing on its jurisdiction to award custody of a child that is physically
present though domiciled elsewhere, is motivated by the
doctrine of parens patriae to hold that it has jurisdiction, thus enabling it to provide for the best interests
of the child.
It seems that the first theory for custody jurisdiction,
which says that the court is acting on behalf of the state
as parens patriaeto provide for the best interests of the
child, better supports the actual physical presence or
residence test than it does the domicile test. This is particularly so where the test of domicile is based on the
patriarchial concept of the family.
Under the second theory, which bases judicial power
to determine custody on the personal jurisdiction of
both parents, the state's interest is merely nominal, as it
does no more than supply the machinery for the peaceful settlement of a dispute.
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This theory is based on the premise that custody
is primarily a question of parental rights and that
the court is simply making a determination as to
which parent, at the particular time, has the best
claim to the child. (Wallace v. Wallace, 320 P. 2d
1020, 1024 (1958) )

Each of the three tests which are used to determine
custody jurisdiction has its merits, but to say any one is
an exclusive test of jurisdiction is to ignore important
considerations involving a child's welfare that may arise
in certain factual situations not within the scope of the
particular test used. In such a situation jurisdiction will
be denied where the child's interests should be protected
and provided for.
But if a degree of flexibility is maintained as to the
test adopted, to best protect the interests of an infant
where the issue of custody is involved a state could apply, depending on the factual situation involved, either
of the three tests in determining if jurisdiction exists
to award custody. The idea here is that if any of the
tests are satisfied, a state has a sufficient social interest
in the welfare of the child to justify its courts in concerning themselves with his custody.
It is hoped, therefore, that the Virginia court will not,
should this question arise at a later date, consider
Gramelspacher as having closed the door on the possibility of applying the other tests. For the decision itself would not seem to preclude the court from holding
that the other tests were applicable, if it felt that the
child's welfare would thus best be served, and this
writer feels that such an interpretation of Gramelspacher would be highly desirable.
ROBERT E. GnZiTMr
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AGENCY & PARTNERSHIP: JOINT ADVENTURES
-What constitutes a "joint adventure" in Virginia, and
if it is found to exist, what is the legal significance of
that relationship as opposed to the partnership?
It may be stated as a general rule that where two or
more persons are engaged in a joint adventure in business, each is liable on the contracts and for the torts of
the other which are incurred by one while acting within
the scope and purpose of the enterprise. For the tort
liability, see Annot., 51 A. L. R. 2d 107. The case of
Smith, Adm'r. v. Grenadier,203 Va. 740, 127 S. E. 2d
107, decided in 1.962, may answer two questions which
existed in Virginia prior to this case. The first, upon
which there were earlier decisions but some confusion, is
the question of what constitutes a joint adventure. The
second, being a question answered in Virginia for the
first time by this decision, is whether one joint adventurer is liable for the torts of the other.
The relationship of joint adventure is closely connected with that of partnership. In Virginia, prior to the
adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act in 1918 there
were no cases holding joint adventures. This was due to
the fact that what would constitute a joint adventure
today would have constituted a partnership at common
law. That is, both consist of an association of two or
more- persons to conduct a business for profit or mutual
benefit. Cases so holding for a partnership in Virginia
prior to the Uniform Partnership Act are Jones v.
Murphy, 93 Va. 214, 24 S. E. 825 (1896), and Miler v.
Simpson, 107 Va. 476, 59 S. E. 378 (1907).
In Jones, supra, where three persons joined their efforts to sell the land belonging to one of them and agreed
to split the profits upon consumating the sale, the court
held this constituted a partnership. It should be noted
that the land was owned by only one member of the
venture. Then, in Miller, supra, where one person supplied the store and goods, the other provided his serv-
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ices, and they agreed to split the profits, the court held a
partnership. Again, note that only one person owned the
property. In both of these cases there was no agreement
as to joint ownership of the property of the enterprise.
Subsequently, the Uniform Partnership Act was
adopted in Virginia in 1918, which defined a partnership as ". . . an association of two or more persons to
carry on as co-owners a business for profit." (Emphasis
added.) Va. Code Ann. §50-6 (Repl. Vol. 1958). It may be
contended that this statutory definition merely codified
the common law definition of partnership because at
common law, where a partnership was found to exist, coownership of the property was implied by law. See
Jones and Miller, supra.However, the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals took the view that the statute required
co-ownership of the property in order to find the existence of a partnership, as the following two cases will
illustrate.
In the case of Walker Co. v. Burgess, 153 Va. 779, 151
S. E. 165 (1930), two persons agreed that one would
provide the lots and capital and the other would provide
the labor for construction of houses thereon, which, after
completion, would be sold and the profits divided between them. In an action by a creditor of one against the
other to recover for the materials supplied, the court
held that no partnership was established as co-ownership of the property was absent.
In Cullingworth v. Pollard,201 Va. 498, 111 S. E. 2d
810, decided in 1960, where two persons agreed to enter
the "used-car" business, one providing the capital and
the other operating the business in his name, the court
again held no partnership, saying, "the essential element of 'co-ownership' of the business as contemplated
by §50-6, supra, is lacking."
Thus, where the element of co-ownership was lacking
in the agreement of two persons to engage in a business
enterprise together, how could a third party who con-
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tracted with one of the parties bind the other? The
course taken in Virginia has been that of joint adventure.
The first case in Virginia to clearly hold a joint adventure was that of Home v. Holley, 167 Va. 234, 188
S. E. 169, decided in 1936. The facts of this case did not
involve any co-ownership or lack of that element, but it
can be noted that the definition of joint adventure stated
by the court did not include any requirement of co-ownership of the property:
"A joint adventure has been aptly defined as a
'special combination of two or more persons, where
in some specific venture a profit is jointly sought
without any actual partnership or corporate designation.' 33 C. J., page 841, Section I." (167 Va. at
239, 188 S. E. at 171)
This definition has been followed and cited by subsequent Virginia cases involving questions of joint adventure. See Pollard & Bagby, Inc. v. Morton G. Thalhimer, Inc., 169 Va. 529, 533, 194 S. E. 701, 702 (1938);
Jones v. Galleher & Co., 187 Va. 602, 604, 47 S. E. 2d
333, 336 (1948).
The case of Jones v. Galleher & Co., supra, added to
the definition established in Home, supra, by stating
that "the scope of the enterprise as to which they must
exercise good conduct and square dealing is, however, to
be found in their contract." This implies that the undertaking need not be specific but may be of any nature
on which the parties agree.
This development of the law of joint adventures now
brings us to Smith, supra, the case under consideration
and the most recent case in Virginia on the subject. The
facts in the case, material to the joint adventure question, were that Rainwater and Grenadier entered into
an agreement whereby Grenadier would contract to purchase construction equipment and in return for the use
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of this equipment Rainwater would make the installment
payments for Grenadier. Grenadier was obligated on
the contract of purchase, and when the equipment was
fully paid for it was to remain his alone. Rainwater, in
the use of this equipment was negligent, causing the
death of an infant. The infant's administrator brought
his action against both Gxenadier and Rainwater as
joint adventurers. The trial court found Rainwater liable
but struck the evidence as to Grenadier. The Supreme
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that
the factual situation was such that a jury could find a
joint adventure existed.
The holding in this case clearly illustrates that coownership is not an element of joint adventure as here
the property was owned solely by one person. And, by
comparing this case with those decided before the
adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act, it is plain
that there is no distinguishing feature between this case
and those which held the relationship a partnership. And
yet, the factual situation of this case would clearly not
be held a partnership in Virginia today.
This conclusion may also be readily reached by comparing the definitions of joint adventure with that of
partnership. Rowley, in his treatise on partnership sets
forth the following as the two most often cited definilions of joint adventure:
•.. a special combination of two or more persons,
where in some specific venture a profit is jointly
sought without any actual partnership or corporate
designation.
An association of two or more persons to carry
out a single business enterprise for profit. (2 RowLnY, PARTNERS IP, §52.2 at 464, 2d ed., 1960)
Contrast these with the statutory definition of partnership:
...

an association of two or more persons to carry
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on as co-owners a business for profit. (Va. Code
Ann. §56-6 (Repl. Vol. 1958) )
The only differentiating feature between this definition
of partnership and those of joint adventure is the element of co-ownership.
The conclusion to be reached by the development of
the law of joint adventures in Virginia is that if the
existence of a partnership is precluded only because the
statutory requirement of co-ownership can not be met,
then the parties may still have a joint adventure.
The question remaining to be answered by future cases
in Virginia is what is the legal significance of a joint
adventure as opposed to a partnership. The Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has held that the liability of
joint adventurers inter se is the same as for partners.
See Home, supra. The court has further held that each
joint adventurer is a party to the contract made by one
as each is the agent for the other when acting within the
scope of the enterprise. See Wiley N. Jackson Co. v. City
of Norfolk, 197 Va. 62, 87 S. E. 2d 781 (1955). And now,
in Smith, supra, the court has held that each joint adventurer is liable for the torts of the other committed
within the scope of the enterprise.
It would appear at this point that the practical effect
of the decisions on joint adventures is to make inoperative the statutory requirement of co-ownership for a
partnership. Where the element of co-ownership is lacking, so as to prevent the establishment of a partnership,
the court may simply hold a joint adventure and then
impose the same liabilities as in a partnership. It remains for future decisions to determine if the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals will distinguish the legal
significance or consequences of a joint adventure from
those of a partnership.
HENny WooDRow CRoOK, Ju.
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JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS: MAY THE SURVIVOR
TAKE7?-Where the deposit by a person is in the
name of himself and another, not his wife, the presumption is that it was done for the purporses of
convenience only.... 38 C. J. S. Gifts §50 (1943)
It seems to be well settled that a bank account
may be so fixed that two persons shall be joint owners thereof during their lives, and the survivor
take on the death of the other. This may depend
upon the terms of the deposit, that is the contract
made with the bank, or upon the intention of the
depositors as disclosed by their declarations, oral or
written. (King, Ex'x. v. Merryman, Adm'x., 1.96 Va.
844, 858, 86 S. E. 2d 141, 148 (1955) )
The preceding statements used by the court in King,
supra, summarized the law in Virginia as to joint bank
accounts of persons, not husband and wife. This case
involved a joint bank account held by Dotson and his
daughter, Mrs. King. On her father's death, Mrs. King,
as executrix of his estate, did not account for the funds
remaining in the bank account as part of the estate. The
other children of Dotson excepted to this accounting, and
it was found by the Commissioner of Accounts, the circuit court, and finally the Supreme Court of Appeals
that neither the contract with the bank nor the actions
and declarations of Dotson showed any intent that Mrs.
King as survivor was to take the balance of the deposit
on his death.
After the court had handed down this decision, there
remained this question in the minds of many lawyers:
If a situation did arise where there was a clear intent
on the part of the decedent that the funds remaining on
deposit after his death should go to the surviving codepositor, would the court allow the survivor to take?
This question arose because such a holding would seem
to violate the strict position which Virginia has. held
against will substitutes. The answer to this question was
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given by the recent decision of Stevens v. Sparks, Ex'x.,
205 Va. 128, 135 S. E. 2d 140 (1964).
Edward Stevens and his wife Dora had lived separate
and apart for the thirty years preceding his death in
1958. About 1930, Vivian Sparks, a nurse, had come to
Stevens' home for the express purpose of caring for his
elderly brothers and sisters. In 1941, Stevens executed
his last will and testament whereby he devised and bequeathed all of his property to Miss Sparks and named
her as executrix of his estate. In 1948, he executed a
codicil to his will by which he devised his residence
to Miss Sparks. Later in 1948 he conveyed the residence
to her in fee simple by deed.
In 1948 and 1950 Stevens opened three joint bank accounts in his name and that of Miss Sparks "as joint
tenants with right of survivorship, and not as tenants
in common." At Stevens' death there remained $28,381.03 on deposit in the three accounts.
Mrs. Stevens renounced her husband's will and elected
to take such share of his estate as she would have been
entitled to had he died intestate. She alleged that the
joint accounts in the names of Stevens and Miss Sparks
were assets of her husband's estate.
Miss Sparks as executrix of Stevens' estate filed a bill
in chancery seeking the -aid and guidance of the court
with respect to this particular claim. The court heard
testimony by a friend of Mr. Stevens to the effect that
Stevens had told him on several occasions that he wanted Miss Sparks to have the money that he had placed in
the joint accounts and that this had been his purpose in
opening the accounts. The chancelor ruled:
... that the presumption that the bank accounts
were placed in the names of Stevens and Miss
Sparks, as a matter of convenience, was conclusively
rebutted by the evidence adduced; that Stevens'
intent in making the deposits was 'established be-
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yond question'; that decedent's estate had no claim
or interest in the accounts, and that the accounts
passed to Miss Sparks according to contract.
(Stevens v. Sparks, Ex'x., supra, at 132)
This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeals.
Though Stevens, supra, set forth no new rule of law
as to joint bank accounts, its importance lay in the fact
that the court used the law set forth in King, supra, and
for the first time found that on its facts Stevens, supra,
was a case in which the presumption of a joint bank account existing for convenience only had been successfully
rebutted, allowing the surviving depositor to take.
Though there are numerous legal problems which
can arise from a situation in which a joint bank account
is opened in the names of two people, not husband and
wife, the one question which prompted this note was
whether a holding such as the one in the Stevens, supra,
which allowed the surviving co-depositor to take, created
a situation in which the other depositor had done a
testamentary act without satisfying the requirements of
Virginia's statute of wills, Va. Code Ann. §64-51 (1950).
The answer to this question can be given simply by saying that such a holding does not create a situation in
which a testamentary act has been done without compliance with the Virginia Statute of Wills. The reason
for this is that the law in Virginia on joint bank accounts is based on the "contract" theory, which is illustrated by the Virginia cases dealing with joint bank
accounts.
The law in Virginia on joint bank accounts began with
the case of Deal's Adm'r. v. Merhants and Mehalinics
Savings Bank, 120 Va. 297, 91 S. E. 135 (1917). The
facts in this case were as follows: Mrs. Deal asked a
friend to deposit her money in a bank because she didn't
expect to live long, and she wanted the money to go to
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her -sister, Ellen C. Holland, when she died. The friend
assured her that he could deposit the money so that it
would go to her sister at her death. He subsequently
deposited the money "on savings account to the credit
of 'Martha S. Deal or Ellen C. Holland.' " The court in
holding that Ellen Holland as survivor was entitled to
the funds in the account said:
We are of opinion that, under the facts of this
case, the effect of the deposit by Mrs. Deal to the
joint credit of herself and her sister was to create
a contract relation between the Bank and the two
joint depositors, under which the amount to the
credit of the account became the property of Ellen
C. Holland as the survivor of decedent and herself.
... [W]hen the deposit in this case was made by
Mrs. Deal for the joint benefit of herself and Mrs.
Holland, in legal effect a loan was made by decedent
and Mrs. Holland to the bank, and the bank was the
debtor to them, and they creditors of the bank, to
the amount of such deposit. It was a pure contractual relation and no question of gift or trust arises
in determining the rights of the parties under such
a contract. (Deal's Adm'r. v. Merchants and
Mechanics Savings Bank, upra, 298-299)
The court in Deal, supra, relied upon the language of
the Massachusetts case of Chippendale v. North Adams
Savings Bank, 222 Mass. 499, 111 N. E. 371 (1916). After
Chippendale, supra,the Massachusetts court later modified its view by holding that the surviving co-depositor
could not take unless the decedent had shown an intention to make a gift of the funds to the survivor.
It was not until King, supra, in 1955 that the problem
of joint bank accounts came before the Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia. In this case, the court cited
Deal, supra, mentioned the further developments in the
law of Massachusetts and arrived at the conclusion that

RECENT CASES

183

where a joint bank account was opened in the name of
two people, not husband and wife, the presumption was
that it was opened for convenience only, but this presumption could be rebutted if an intention to make a gift
of the funds could be shown by the terms of the contract with the bank or by the oral or written declarations
of the depositors, and if the presumption was successfully rebutted, the survivor could take.
Though the fact that the survivor takes the funds may
be considered by some as a gift by the other depositor to
take effect at his death, i.e., a testamentary act, it is
saved from being considered as such because the "... . gift
is effected through the instrumentality of the contract
between the bank and the depositors." (King, Ex'x. v.
Merryman, Adn'r., supra at 852)
What conclusions, then, have been reached by this note
and what purpose can it serve?
The primary conclusion reached is that since Virginia adheres to the "contract" theory of joint bank
accounts, allowing the surviving depositor to take does
not create a situation in which the decedent has done a
testementary act outside of the Virginia Statute of
Wills.
Since this conclusion has been reached, no valid argument can be raised against the holding in Stevens,
supra, and executors and administrators must now beware when they find their decedent was a co-depositor in
a joint bank account, because the funds remaining on his
death may be assets in his estate, or they may be the
property of the surviving depositor; and the controlling
factor as to whether they are assets of the estate or not
may hinge entirely on the amount of evidence the surviving depositor can bring forth to show the decedent
intended to make him a gift of the funds remaining in
the account on the decedent's death.
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